This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel since the rise of former Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, to 2011 was one of cold peace (e.g., Gerges, 1995; Siman Tov, 2000; Miller, 2000; Abadi, 2006; Stein, 2007). To this end, the first part of the paper draws on the burgeoning literature in International Relations examining how and why peace between states emerges, stabilizes and consolidates (Kupchan, 2010; Kacowicz, 2000; Boulding, 1978; Deutsch, 1957). It uses five analytical variables—the impact of great powers, the propensity to revert back to war, foreign policy tools employed, regional factors, the role of intellectuals—to distinguish between three types of peace, which are subsequently used to examine Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel 1981-2011: cold peace, strategic peace, and stable peace Informed by this analytical framework, primary sources in English, Arabic and Hebrew, and interviews conducted by the author in Egypt and Israel in November 2012, the second part of the paper focuses on the empirical analysis. It identifies patters of change and continuity in Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel 1981-2011, which demonstrate that by 1991 Egypt departed from its cold peace foreign policy stance towards Israel. Subsequently, it is argued, the 1991-2004 period set in motion a number of changes, which lay the ground for Egypt adopting a strategic peace foreign policy stance towards Israel since the early 2000s. This stance entailed a significant degree of Egyptian-Israeli politico-military strategic cooperation in relation to the Palestinians, Iran, and the Global War on Terror; trust and routine exchange of information between Egyptian and Israeli politicians and civil servants; a significant rise in the economic activity between the two countries; greater involvement by the US than in previous periods; and backing by a small yet significant number of Egyptian intellectuals. The contribution of the paper is twofold. First it refutes the conventional wisdom that between 1981 and 2011 Egyptian foreign policy towards Israel was one of cold peace. Second, the paper introduces a new analytical category—strategic peace—to the literature examining how and why peace between states can be stabilized and consolidated. To date, the debate has focused primarily on the experience of rich and democratic countries. Attention to poor authoritarian states, such as Egypt under the rule of Hosni Mubarak, is scarce.