Existing explanations for the 2011 uprising in Syria identify authoritarianism and, or, climate change as the main causal variables for the revolt. Syria became a showcase for critics of the Arab Spring, eager to point to the dangers of instability and transition to democratization. Proponents of climate security discourses have also heralded Syria as a striking empirical application for conceptualizations of climate change-induced conflicts. These studies now point to the 2006-2010 drought and the effects of climate change as the incipient factors of the Syrian conflict; and argue that the decimation of rural economy was induced by drought and water scarcity, which has ultimately driven farmers away from their farms into the cities where they fueled social tensions. The paper strongly argues against this conventional wisdom. Since repression and environmental degradation are constant themes in Syria’s post-independence history, they cannot however explain why the Syrian people rebelled in 2011. It also fills a gap in the literature by explaining how the combined effects of authoritarianism and environmental insecurity concerns intensified the human, political and social grievances at the roots of the Syrian Revolution. Hence, this paper argues that political violence arose because of a combination of poverty levels in the midst of extraordinary wealth, environmental degradation and social, political and institutional failures to address these challenges. The drought indeed shattered the livelihood of the populations in the northeastern part of the country. But the likely impacts of the drought on subsequent uprisings are found in political, economic, and environmental mismanagement. Baathist food security objectives and industrialization policies encouraged the over-exploitation of Syria’s aquifers. The ‘new’ Assad regime opted in 2005 to move away from a centrally planned statist type of economy by liberalizing major sectors such as banking and education, to the detriment of Baathist social constituencies in the rural peripheries. In doing so, the government intensified existing networks of corruption and failed to provide coping institutions or mechanisms to deal with environmental stress. Based on primary sources collected before 2011, and extensive field research carried out with Syrian refugees and activists in Lebanon post-2011, the analysis explores past practices relating to water management in the context of authoritarian rule and the politics of liberalization that were initiated in the decade that preceded the Uprising. Such endeavors illuminate opportunities for tailoring strategies for the restoration of an economic, political and social order in post-conflict Syria.