One objection against the theory of kasb comes from the Mutazilite scholars: God’s justice implies that God cannot commit injustice. But, if He creates bad acts as the defenders of the theory of kasb put forward, he commits injustice by creating evils that humans commit. Since God cannot commit injustice, He cannot create evil acts. Therefore, it should be man who creates his own bad acts. This paper concerns with this objection. After a brief historical background, I start with a comparison of creating evil and permitting evil. I argue that there is no difference between creating evil and permitting evil with respect to the problem of evil because evil cannot be attributed to God in terms of the responsibility in both situations. My response is on the same line with the idea of some Ottoman Ma’turidite thinkers and a contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga. I reply to a possible objection according to which creating evil and permitting evil are not the same because in the first case God is directly responsible for bringing about the evil while in the latter, He is indirectly responsible for it. I reply that they are still equal to each other with respect to the problem of evil as long as evil can be attributed to human beings with respect to their intention because it is God who is the ultimate originator of evil either by creating or permitting evil. More recently, Alvin Plantinga responded to this Mu’tazilian type of argument in a paper where he defends occasionalism. He argues that there is no difference between direct and indirect creation of evil. Matthew Shea and C. P. Ragland responded to him by pointing out the difference between them depending on the doctrine of doing and allowing. Lastly, I reply to their argument by arguing that we cannot apply this distinction to divine acts. Therefore, it is my aim to show that if permitting evil is not injustice as most of the theists and Mu’tazilite scholars agree, creating evil is also not injustice because ultimately there is no difference between direct and indirect creation.