There is broad agreement on three overarching facts about the economic evolution of Egypt and Tunisia. First, they were the celebrated macroeconomic “success stories” of neoliberalism in the Arab Mediterranean and participated fully in the worldwide economic boom of the 2000-2008 period. Rapid economic growth, liberalization, privatization, success in attracting foreign investment and expanding exports, and constricting the public sector to enable the private sector to take over as the engine of growth and new job creation, all accorded with the neoliberal model. Second, the spread of negative features ultimately underpinned the uprisings of 2010-2011, including stubborn unemployment, especially among educated youth, the expanding informal economy and uneven regional development. Organized labor was constrained and salaries and wages for the majority of the workforce stagnated or fell as the incomes of a wealthy, well-connected elite soared. Public services were constricted while ownership and control of assets like land were redistributed to the elite through endemic graft and systematic corruption. The state was fused to the wealthy owners of capital, giving most benefits of liberalization and privatization to a class of crony capitalists. Fraud in politics and the often-brutal repression of labor and opposition movements led to rising anger among the citizenry, with maneuvering by the ruling families to convert their presidencies into dynastic rule a final and fatal insult. Throughout the 2000s, despite political oppression, these opposition movements grew among both the middle and working classes. Third, as of September 2013, none of the governments that followed the ousting of the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes in 2011 had been able to present a coherent program for more equitable and sustainable economic transformation, while political turmoil, violence – in Tunisia’s case, two political assassinations, and, in Egypt’s case, a military coup d’état -- and economic uncertainty prevailed. Aside from the perpetuation of slow growth, rising unemployment and inequality due to the atmosphere of mistrust and uncertainty, there is a wide range of possible alternatives for economic transformation. From “right to left” these include (1) neoliberalism with an inclusive mask, as promoted by the IMF and the Deauville Partnership, (2) an elite-led developmental state and industrial policy in the East Asian mode, (3) a more egalitarian developmental state as proposed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), and (4) a social-democratic formation as encoded in the work of NGOs and the independent trade union movements.