This paper takes as a starting point claims that the roots of Tunisian discontent lie in grievances generated by the implementation of a structural adjustment programme endorsed, and even directed, by the IMF and fellow international financial institutions. However, the paper moves the focus of study away from structural adjustment itself as a set of policy instruments and designs, and looks instead at the way in which performance is measured and appraisals made, ultimately arguing that faults at this level enable regimes to disguise their own self-interested manipulation and distortion of the reform process, with – in the Tunisian case – catastrophic consequences. The paper starts by reviewing the results of the economic reforms implemented under the Ben Ali regime as they were presented over time, and the arguments of the IMF that Tunisia was a regional role model, a success story for neo-liberal restructuring. Such arguments proved ultimately to be substantially incorrect. The Tunisian uprising reflected a growing crisis of unemployment, price inflation, poverty, inequality and corruption. Investigating the discrepancies between the international portrayal of the economy, and the realities as they were lived by the Tunisian population, unveils both the flaws in the way in which the international financial institutions measure success, and the manner in which regimes can manipulate and disguise the data which informs their judgements. More crucially, it shines light on the hidden stories of economic liberalisation under authoritarian regimes and the manner in which the instruments of reform translate into distortions and subversions of the very agendas they supposedly seek to promote. Ultimately the Tunisian story enables us to shed light on the roots of popular discontent in order to prepare for a more contextualised discussion of the origins of dissent.