Elections in post-2003 Iraq are typical cases of “a snapshot census on ethnicity,” as K. Samuels (2009:184) describes, if we include sectarian factors in ethnicity. Most of the analysis on post-2003 elections in Iraq underline the role of sect-based identity politics, though recent arguments point out the shift from sectarian mobilization to an issue-based electoral strategy (Mansour 2018) or to policies based on generation (Patel 2018). Scholars who emphasize sectarian factors mostly ascribe the difference in mobilization pattern of the major electoral blocs to sectarian differences, focusing on the persistence of sect-based mobilization among “Shi’ites” while tribal mobilization is more effective in “Sunni” regions. This presentation, however, casts doubt on the coincidence between territoriality and co-sectarian solidarity in electoral politics and places more importance on local interests based on the former rather than the latter as a driver in the elections in post-2003 Iraq. My question here is how the major electoral political blocs, most of which are led by former expatriates from Iran, Syria and the UK, deal with the local political figures and parties, while pursuing their political goals at the national level. For that purpose, I analyze how the major electoral political blocs have formed alliances with medium- and small-sized political parties and prepared the lists of the candidates for the elections, both national and governorate, since 2005. In order to analyze which type of candidates the political parties or blocs understand are able to obtain more votes from the voters, I introduce the notion of “source of the fame,” that is, candidates’ social and political affiliations and backgrounds which could be the points aiding voters to judge when choosing electoral blocs or candidates. Analysis shows three patterns of nomination of the candidates that reflect the views of the current political powers on the possible preference of the voters. They are (1) established elites both from higher posts in the government or parliament, (2) local leaders who have contributed the local communities, and (3) traditional social elites who rely on their sub-state social identity (religious, sectarian and tribal identity) for their social influence. Pattern (3) was only dominant in 2005 and shifted to pattern (2) afterward in both “Shi’ite” and “Sunni” regions.