Alfarabi in many occasions introduces religion as an imitation (????????) of philosophy. This claim, despite its novelty and boldness for his time, strikes the reader as odd. What does it mean for a religion to be an imitation of philosophy? Alfarabi’s attempts to explain what he means by the claim, in fact, causes more puzzlement rather than clarification. In Tahsil, for instance, he states that both religion and philosophy “comprise the same subjects, and both give an account of the ultimate principles of being. For both supply knowledge about the first principle and cause of beings, and both give an account of the ultimate end for the sake of which man is made—that is, supreme happiness—and the ultimate end of every one of the other beings” (90:15-21). This attempt for clarification is puzzling for it claims that both religion and philosophy “comprise the same subjects” while he leaves open the possibility that each one might give different and even contradictory accounts of the same subjects. The same can be said about the other alleged similarities that he draws between religion and philosophy, such as their respective accounts about the first principle, the ultimate principle, and human happiness. Beside the similarities that Alfarabi attributes the two, he mentions about a difference between religion and philosophy is the approach that each one takes. Alfarabi explains, “In everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual perception or conception, religion gives an account bases on imagination. In everything demonstrated by philosophy, religion employs persuasion” (40:13-19). The difference between a rational account based on demonstration and an account based on imitation by using persuasive approaches is massive, and it has serious implications for Alfarabi’s initial contention that religion is an imitation of philosophy. Furthermore, the difference between demonstration and persuasion creates another rift between philosophy and religion. It is the difference between Aristotle’s discussion in his Organon and Metaphysics on the one hand and the metaphorical language and storytelling of the Bible. This vagueness in Alfarabi’s claim about religion while hi attempts for clarification causes more ambiguity deserves a scholarly investigation. In my paper, I shall argue that Alfarabi’s contention, religion as an imitation of philosophy, is an introduction to his method of writing which is philosophical representation or reformulation of religious beliefs. I shall also explain reasons for why, I think, he tries to represent religious beliefs philosophically.