On three separate occasions in post-revolutionary Iran (October 2008, July 2010, and October 2012) striking merchants shuttered bazaars across the country in protest against state economic policies. Do the strikes against the Ahmadinejad government, and their relative success for the bazaaris, signify the Bazaar moving away from the overarching Islamic Republic regime it helped usher into power? This paper will analyze the Iranian Bazaar as a micro-culture wielding both economic and political clout in the era of the Islamic Republic. I focus on the bazaari reaction to the seismic political shift begun in 1979 and the ensuing transformation of the Bazaar, which remains at once a merchant class, a political actor, and a cultural unit unto itself. The purpose of this inquiry is to evaluate the Bazaar’s collective political efficacy following regime consolidation (1979-1983) to the present day. The Bazaar’s relevancy as a cohesive political force has declined during the period in question, resulting from a multitude of factors, which include (a) macro-level trade developments (e.g. globalization, the rise of Dubai), (b) the ascension of competing entities domestically, namely the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and (c) the atomization of the bazaari class, which has rendered the Bazaar a shadow of its former self, politically-speaking. I draw from the scholarship of Arang Keshavarzian, who shows that bazaaris flourished under Mohammad Reza Shah and maintained vast political autonomy, whereas in the Islamic Republic, they have become fractured and politically weakened. Benjamin Smith’s work, which challenges widely-held perceptions of an immutable “bazaar-mosque” alliance, and depicts bazaaris foremost as pragmatists, also informs this paper. While powerful bazaaris still exist, and some are reinforcing pillars for the Iranian clerical elite, collectively they have declined in power. Moreover, political organizations and trade unions, such as the Islamic Coalition Party and the Society of Islamic Associations of Guilds and Bazaars of Tehran (SIABGT), which ostensibly exist to promote the interests of the Bazaar, are led by co-opted elites disconnected from the concerns of bazaaris at ground level. Overall the political outlook for the Bazaar as a collectivity is bleak due to its disunity. The October 2012 bazaar shutdown, which SIABGT leadership condemned as a product of “treacherous actions” is just one example of such discord. Finally, this paper will analyze current Bazaar trends using Tehran-based Western and Iranian media reports to assess the future collective political prospects of Iranian bazaaris, which I conclude will continue to diminish.