My research examines the expansionist policies adopted by the Ottoman state in Africa between 1882 and 1902. During this period of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s rule, the Ottoman state utilized new multi-layered techniques of imperialism to assert it claim to new territories in central Africa. One of these techniques was the development of new alliances with power brokers in the region. In this paper, I will focus on this aspect of the Ottoman government’s approach to the so-called ‘Scramble for Africa’ from 1885 onwards. For after the Conference of Berlin of 1885, in which the Ottoman Empire was a participant and a signatory to the resulting Act of Berlin, Sultan Abdülhamid II’s government publically claimed the right of ‘possession’ of the territories stretching from the Libyan coast to the Lake Chad basin. In addition to the launch of a diplomatic campaign to argue for Ottoman ‘right’ to this region, the Ottoman government embarked on a mission to solidify its ties with the local power broker; the leader of the Sanusi Sufi Order. By 1885, he Sanusi Order’s leadership had established itself as the legitimate local economic, political and spiritual power, which the vast majority of the local Bedouin inhabitants of the region recognized. I will present a revisionist history of the traditional knowledge about the Ottoman relationship to the Sanusi Order and the Bedouin tribes of the Libyan interior as being one marked by an antagonistic ‘imperial state’ vs. ‘locals’ relationship. I argue that he opposite was in fact the case, as I will present evidence from the British and Ottoman archives that point to a strategic partnership forged between the Ottoman imperial government and the Sanusi order in an effort to fend off competing British and French colonial expansionist attempts into the eastern Sahara; a relationship which lasted in different forms until the beginning of the Franco-Libyan War of 1900-1902.