On October 26, 2014, Tunisia held it’s second legislative election nearly three years after nationwide protests resulted in the resignation and departure of the country’s longtime dictator, Zine Abedine Ben Ali. While Tunisia’s transition to democracy is still very much a work in progress, it has become a cliché to describe it as the Arab Spring’s only success story. In 2011, the country’s premier Islamist party, the Ennahda Movement, cruised to victory with 37% of the popular vote: no other party received more than 10%. In 2014, Islamists lost handily to Nidaa Tounes, a loose coalition of secular rivals with links to the former regime. Nidaa Tounes received 38% of the popular vote, compared to Ennahda’s 27%. The magnitude of Ennahda’s loss is stunning: in absolute terms, the party lost over a third of its voters. This paper builds on an original dataset of electoral returns at the polling station level (N = 10,567) to account for vote switching and electoral volatility in the Tunisian context. I use evidence from four recent Tunisian elections: legislative elections in 2011, legislative elections in 2014, and the first and second round of presidential elections in 2014. The dataset is currently in the final stages of completion, and results of the analysis are not currently available. I also use delegation-level census data and demographic, economic, and social surveys from the National Institute of Statistics in Tunisia to analyze patterns of volatility over Tunisia’s first competitive elections.