In May 1971, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (r. 1970-1981) appointed police officer Mamdouh Salem to head the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Four years later, Salem became the country’s prime minister and the first police officer to be selected to such high executive position. Salem’s appointments registered a new shift under Sadat towards institutional independence. Although military men continued to control the presidency, a closer examination of dynamics of governance in Egypt shows that the MoI, a civilian institution of force, has gained control over domestic security since the 1970s. Under President Gamal Abd al-Nasser (r. 1952-1970), the military had full control over missions of external and internal security. During the 18 years of Nasser’s rule, the MoI was headed by military officers except for a brief period of 2 years. The military also controlled all intelligence apparatuses. This arrangement changed dramatically under Sadat, who awarded more independence to the MoI, enhanced its capacity and delegated missions of domestic control to it. This paper investigates the relationship between presidents Nasser and Sadat and their institutions of force as a case for changes in domestic security arrangements in militarized authoritarian regimes. Whereas most leaders in militarized regimes rely on militaries for domestic control, some re-assign this responsibility to civilian institutions of force such as ministries of interior (MoIs) and their police forces. This shift and the deepening of police powers since Sadat raise important questions that are relevant to our understanding of domestic security arrangements and authoritarian rule more generally. I ask: Why do authoritarian ruling elites shift their reliance on civilian institutions of force for domestic security? What conditions are necessary for this shift? And in what ways do civilian institutions of force support authoritarian regimes? I argue that leaders rely on MoIs to decrease their reliance on and vulnerability to their militaries, and ultimately minimize their interference in politics. The paper follows the comparative historical approach and relies on extensive field work that includes archival research, participant observation and interviews with experts and officers.