This paper explores the ways in which the War on Terror discourse of the Bush Administration following the 9/11 attacks shaped new metaphorical enemies and strategic alliances among U.S. “enemies” in the region. During the Cold War, U.S. National Intelligence Estimates clearly outlined communists as enemies and this framing helped fuel U.S. perceptions of threats, policy actions to counter these threats and reactions from the Soviet Union. The same is true in the War on Terror discourse, only that conflict lacked a single enemy. Therefore, the process of constructing an alliance of regional actors to replace the Cold War threat ensued. This paper analyzes how the War on Terror rhetoric obliged state elites in Iran, Syria and elsewhere in the region to rethink sovereign norms due to the Bush Doctrine. The creation of this new existential threat affected policy choices and voter behavior in these countries. This paper also explores the reverse process—how rhetoric and discourse from the region affects U.S. foreign policy surrounding Iran and the “Shiite Crescent.” The term, coined by King Abdullah II of Jordan in 2004, refers to the formation of a Shiite regional bloc led by Iran, and is ostensibly composed of Iraq, Alawites in Syria, and Hezbollah. This rhetoric on Iranian expansion fit well with U.S. security interests surrounding the War on Terror and the need to protect our Sunni allies. It was translated into reality as Iran became central to U.S. foreign policy postures after the birth of the term “Shiite crescent.” The power of rhetoric lies in its ability to take on a life of its own, facilitating alliances among otherwise incompatible forces. Moreover, it leads elites in the region to engage this framing and to follow policy paths in reaction to it. That is not to say that threats are not real, but that the ways in which conflict is framed and generalized has unintended consequences. It is not the case that all Shiites in the region are allies. Yet the pervasive rhetoric surrounding the power of the Shiite crescent prevents some from seeing such things as cooperation between Sunnis and Shiites and conflict within Sunni or Shiite groups.