This paper examines a particular line of authoritarian learning that is both domestic and spatial, as opposed to the more mainstream international cross-state dimension. It maintains a top-down perspective of how the Syrian regime operated regarding potential threats of rebellion before and after the uprising of the 1980s. How did the regime restructure both the social make-up of central neighborhoods and manipulate the religious circles and classes traditionally opposed to it? In pursuit of an answer, the study will highlight the socio-spatial conditions for mobilization that were present during the uprising in terms of the built environment and social networks, and how the regime targeted both elements in the following decades. To do so, it will examine the spatial scales of political economy that are intertwined with urban and socio-economic vectors throughout the city. The emphasis will be on neighborhoods in Aleppo that witnessed the highest levels of urban challenge against the regime by the Militant Vanguard and subsequent mobilization the lasted for 6 months in 1980. This learning stands out in comparison with other Arab regimes and its consequences were patent in 2011 as a process of suburbanization of contention took place. That said, the learning happened through a process of trial-and-error and was not complete given issues of capacity. The limits of this learning, just like classic kinds of learning, will be traced. The paper will employ qualitative causal narrative analysis and consult evidence collected from interviews (with activists and politicians from the neighborhoods and networks in question), political memoirs, spatial analysis, census data, and original event datasets on the two rounds of uprisings in 1980 and 2011.