The aim of this article is to examine and analyze the causes that led to the failure of peace making and peace building in post-war Lebanon. We emphasize that the Tai’f Agreement of 1989-1990 that ended the Lebanese civil war was negotiated between the Lebanese political elites failed to improve inter-communal relations at the grassroots level those who represent the population at large. The political elites were interested in securing their sectarian and confessional privileges and interests rather than taking initiatives and making policies to address the consequences of the war on inter-group relations between Christians and Muslims. A big number of the internally displaced persons and refugees did not return to their villages and the fate of the disappeared remained unknown. In 2000, the Maronite Church took the initiative to improve inter-group relations in Mount Lebanon as a peace making effort but reconciliation did not take place. We use John Paul Lederach’s pyramid as an analytical approach to focus on particular concerns that affected the population in a setting of internal armed conflict. The Pyramid permits us to lay out the leadership that should be engaged in peace making at three major categories: top level, middle range, and the grassroots. During different stages inter-group violence recurred in Lebanese society mainly because quality peace was not made. We conclude that a multi track approach is necessary to build sustainable peace.