The paper will analyse the roots and dynamics of the alliance between Syria and the East Germany in the early phase of the Ba’thist regime (1963-1970). The paper will show how material interests first, and the challenges of development set out by social and political conflicts soon after moved the Ba’thist regime closer to communist East Germany. These factors, in turn, opened the stage for the “translation” by Syrian officials of the institutional framework offered by the GDR along their needs and beliefs. At first, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) made inroads into the Arab country because of the waning influence of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), whose alliance in the Western camp of the Cold War and posture towards Israel disrupted its presence in Syria. Though not exactly interchangeable, East Germany partially filled the gap left by the Western rival: non-monetary trade transactions, high and medium-level technology, professional training and political support in international arenas were the main “goods” imported by Damascus from Berlin. As such, material as well as “realist” considerations among Syrian officials drove the regime closer to the GDR. The paper will set out the main elements forging this dimension on the basis of commercial accounts and diplomatic correspondence. However, facing the rising expectations of their social constituencies and the attacks from their rivals, the Ba’thist leaders in Damascus looked at the GDR as a valuable partner for their development projects as well, in particular as far as the reform of the central state apparatus was concerned. The extensive archival research integrated with oral interviews has shown the importance of the convergence on ideas and beliefs on key-issues like: the role of the state in economy, the patterns of social mobilization and discipline, the relationship between the Party and the Army. The control of the state and its bureaucracy was a central element in their project to transform Syria and the Arab world at large. As such, their programmes were a peculiar “translation” of the development process elaborated at that time along the patterns of “modernization” theories. Through the comparative analysis of GDR reports and Syrian official documents and reports, as well as oral interviews conducted in both countries, the paper will highlight the differences and similarities between Syrian and East German approaches to development and how these changed over time along their implementation by the Syrian and German officials deployed on the ground.