The Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002 with promises of democratizing Turkey. However, over the years, as the party increased its popular support in elections, the democratic regime began backsliding into authoritarianism. In flagrant disregard for the constitution, the government and the President routinely violate rights of any opposition, including those in the media, the Kurds, Alevis, the youth, feminists, even the pious Sunni women who happened to criticize the government or the academics. The situation is reminiscent of the democratic paradox (a la Chantal Mouffe) where electoral majorities that strengthen a government can lead to a restriction of rights and freedoms. Whether we name this turn as a drift toward “competitive authoritarianism”, a process of de-democratization, or the age old “tyranny of the majority”, there is a massive violation of rights by the government and the state that requires an explanation. Even though there is a vast literature on democratic collapse, gradual regime change has attracted less attention. While scholars have named hybrid regimes, there is less on how or why the slide towards hybridity takes shape. In this paper, I shall argue that this gradual decline of democracy in Turkey became possible because the party struck an authoritarian bargain with its constituency: the supporters of the party tolerated violation of rights in return for economic or political stability. People are interested in promoting their interests and the Justice and Development Party responded to their needs. In a context where the opposition is weak and electoral competition is skewed in favor of the incumbents, strong popular support can undermine rather than empower the democratic regime. I use secondary material and present an interpretive analysis of the political developments in Turkey to elaborate my thesis.