This paper analyzes media content about theologically charged rhetoric used by Egyptian Islamists after they came to power in post 2011-Egypt. Many believe that satirist Bassem Youssef was central in turning public opinion against the Islamists. This research is based on 60 structured interviews I conducted with Muslim Egyptians (ages 20 to 35) between 2018 and 2019 and an analysis of Bassem Youssef’s show “al-Barnameg.” When Muhammad Mursi, a Muslim Brotherhood leader, was elected president in 2012, opponents of the Brotherhood felt emboldened to challenge and mock the new president and his decisions. The revolution and Mursi’s inability to control the airwaves allowed for freedom of the press to flourish, despite ultimately hurting the Brotherhood’s image. My interlocutors noted that the media, both traditional and social, made them aware of Mursi’s perceived political ineptitude and lack of charisma. Bassem Youssef, described as Egypt's Jon Stewart, played an important role in raising awareness about the missteps of the Islamists. The visuality of the Islamist beard, on which Youssef capitalized throughout his show, became symbolically important. The beard and what it represented reflected a serious political and social reality: a palpable divide between those who referred to themselves as Islamists and anyone who opposed them. Youssef made fun of bearded Muslim preachers and politicians mercilessly, much to the delight of his audience. He exposed the Islamists’ and their supporters’ use of religious discourse to legitimize Mursi’s rule (Armbrust 2019). Youssef’s show made some of the disappointing and shocking statements made by Islamists memorable to many people, including my interlocutors. Some of those moments were further immortalized on social media in short soundbites that people shared. Gordon and Arafa (2014) argue that Youssef’s “orientation is clearly secular,” but I contend that he did not shy away from his identity as a Muslim. Youssef wanted to shame the Brotherhood’s bearded supporters for preaching one type of outward religiosity but displaying another when their political interests were at stake. Youssef’s disappointment in, perhaps even disgust with, the Muslim preachers who openly attacked their opponents, reflected the negative moral emotions many of my interlocutors also harbored toward the preachers in the aftermath of the Islamists’ short political tenure and the ultimate defeat of the revolution.