Building upon the literature on domestic sources of autocracy, scholars have begun to analyze the international dimensions of authoritarianism. This paper intends to make a contribution to that growing literature by comparing the response of the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), United States (US), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to the 2013 coup and subsequent counterrevolution in Egypt. Inversing and expanding the framework developed by Levitsky and Way, who argue that the extent to which international actors can promote democratization depends on the extent of linkage and leverage that the West has vis-à-vis autocratic regimes, I compare the degree of linkage and leverage of the EU, AU, US, and GCC vis-à-vis Egypt from 2013 until 2018. Rather than asking to what extent these four actors promote democratization, I assess their reaction to the coup and counterrevolution that undermined the democratic interlude after the fall of Mubarak in 2011. The United States arguably had more leverage over Egypt than the other international actors, as Egypt is the second biggest recipient of US military aid in the world. However, after Morsi was ousted, American officials were willing to circumvent their own laws on foreign aid provision, which would have required a suspension of military aid after a coup d’etat, in order to continue supporting the post-coup government, instead opting to only place a temporary hold on certain arms shipments. EU countries continued arms shipments as well. By contrast, the African Union upheld its laws that require member states to be expelled after a coup d’etat. Finally, I analyze financial flows from the GCC, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to the Central Bank in Egypt which began just days after Morsi was ousted on July 3. By comparing the responses of multiple international actors to the coup and counterrevolution in Egypt, I endeavor to offer a multi-dimensional analysis of the external forces that led to the undermining of Egypt’s first democratically-elected government. Furthermore, my findings challenge the assumption that it is primarily Western countries that have the ability to promote democratization through linkage and leverage.