Following Kuwait’s 2009 elections, several newly elected politicians expressed their commitment to work constructively with the government in order to break the political deadlock of the three previous years. Even though the government has not seen a stable majority supporting it in all votes, it has been able to gain support in all but one through an ever-changing majority. Yet, over the past few months, government support in the parliament has been declining, while the level of crisis has been increasing, with even the Prime Minister barely surviving a vote of no-confidence. This paper raises the question of what caused this apparent shift in alliances, and investigates the strategies pursued by both government and the opposition in order to gain support for their view. A set of key factors is suggested, identifying those crucial components which may make or break a majority. The starting point of this paper is that Kuwait is not a fully fledged democracy; the Emir is at liberty to dissolve the parliament, the government is appointed and not based on a parliamentary majority, and political parties are forbidden, among other things. These democratic shortcomings are the subject of heated debate in Kuwait, and many oppositional figures frame their work within the context of a struggle for democratization. Yet, there are other important factors at play as well; social tensions along sectarian and geographical lines, members of the royal family positioning themselves on the political stage, MPs concern for re-election, and of course the ever present question of resource allocation in a rentier state. Through in-depth analysis of voting patterns, draft bills and parliamentary debates, combined with qualitative interviews with key actors, this paper seeks to measure the importance of the different factors given above, both alone and combined with each other. By doing so, the aim is to establish the boundaries for constructive cooperation between the government and a parliamentary majority, and not least how, why and by whom these boundaries are crossed. On this basis, we will argue that democratic shortcomings alone do not explain the current shift in the parliament. Rather the lack of democracy works in tandem with the extent to which Kuwaiti politics are driven by a set of shifting and conflicting parochial interests to the detriment of any longterm ideological and political vision. The product is a political environment in which any attempt at strategic planning and development remains highly vulnerable.