This paper examines the Iraqi branch of the Muslim Brotherhood during the period between the 1991 and 2003 Gulf Wars. Inter-Arab disputes, regional dynamics of the Iran-Iraq War, and Saddam Hussein’s stance in the 1990-1991 Gulf Crisis all had led Ba’thist Iraq to develop working relationships with several foreign branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and a host of Islamist groups. This dynamic did not apply to internal Iraqi affairs. Similar to the Shi’i Islamist opposition to the Ba’th party, the Sunni Islamist Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood had been targeted and severely repressed by the regime’s security services during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result, its activities were driven underground and surviving senior leadership forced into exile, where they remained until the toppling of the regime in 2003. While Islamist opposition groups remained banned and the “Salafi-Wahhabi” threat was a major security concern, the “Faith Campaign” undertaken by Saddam’s regime following 1991 Gulf War, resulted in the growing prominence of Islam in the Iraqi public sphere over the following decade. Some scholarship has suggested that the Faith Campaign may have inadvertently benefitted remaining pro-Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Islamist activists. This was particularly the case in and around the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, a historical base of support for the group. During the 1990s, there was even a rumor inside Iraq and among opposition circles abroad that there had been a tacit agreement between the Ba’thist regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, permitting the latter to engage in activities deemed not to be politically threatening. Drawing on the Ba’th Party records, Iraqi secret police files, and several memoirs of Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood leaders from the period, this paper will address the issue in an attempt to define the extent to which repression, cooptation, and accommodation were part of the regime’s interaction with Sunni Islamist activists in Mosul during its final decade in power.