Since the early stage of the Oslo process, the Palestinian National Authority Security Forces (PNASF) have exerted a pivotal role throughout the Palestinian self-government experience. Key asset for the implementation of security arrangements, the Palestinian security organizations were required to operate to enforce internal security, dismantle terror infrastructures, and quell any source of political opposition to the Peace Process. The operational coordination with Israel’s military and security devices deployed in the OPT (Occupied Palestinian Territory) constituted the center of gravity of Israel-Palestinian National Authority (PNA) security dialogue, critical to both parties’ interest to secure the transitional phase. Nevertheless, the outbreak of al-Aqsa Intifada (September 2000) wreaked collapse on Oslo security coordination and concurrently provided external actors with leeway to gain leverage on the Palestinian security decision-making process. “Peace through security” became the equation shaping the diplomatic and public discourse, and the assumption for engaging international sponsors to a renewed Palestinian state-building endeavour. A conceptual framework for the Palestinian Security Sector Reform (SSR) was thus outlined under the Road Map initiative (April 30, 2003). Accordingly, reforms were devised as the essential pre-condition to resume strategic and operational security cooperation with Israel, and to consolidate a “[...] sustained, effective Palestinian security performance”, aiming at the stabilization of Palestinian institutions and internal political layout. Thereby, the Hamas electoral victory (2006) and its takeover of the Gaza Strip (June 15, 2007), disclosed the political dimension embedded with an internationally-sponsored Palestinian SSR. Ever since, the alignment of interests between fundamental players – donors community, Israel, PNA – conforms SSR programs and the PNASF operations in the West Bank. Necessarily, this paper would challenge the current SSR setting and the PNASF operational framework, not responding to basic Palestinian security needs. This paper would argue how SSR programs have helped building up Palestinian counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency capabilities, and how PNASF operations impact on the internal political and social dynamics while providing security to Israel. Finally, this paper overviews the lines of operation of Palestinian National Authority Security Forces, it outlines the operational coordination with Israel’s military and security devices, and demonstrates how the PNASF operational framework produces intra-Palestinian Human Rights violations.