The first post Arab Spring elections in North Africa witnessed the victory of most of the moderate Islamist parties. Hoping to capitalize on that “Islamist wave” their Algerian counterparts created an alliance called “The Green Alliance” that was, nonetheless, severely defeated in the May 2012 Legislative Elections. In Algeria, the moderate Islamist parties were created in 1989, further to the so-called country’s democratic opening and were centered on two main parties, HAMAS , and NAHDA , both very close to the Muslim Brothers. Since then, adopting a non-violent political opposition posture towards the regime, these two parties have rejected the FIS radical strategy that plunged the country into a ten-year civil war. However, recruiting essentially among the pious bourgeoisie and calling for a political compromise, they gathered little support within the Islamist camp during the 1989-1992 years, compared with FIS quasi-hegemony. Yet, after the 1992 FIS political ban and the ongoing the dramatic civil war, they attracted the Islamist voters, especially, HAMAS, as witnessed by the 1995 presidential election outcomes, where its candidate ranked second to the regime candidate with 25% of the votes. Hence, from 1997 to 2012, HAMAS supported President Bouteflika’s National Reconciliation policy, whereas NAHDA maintained its non-violent political opposition. But, contrary to the expectations, the moderate Islamist camp fragmented into 25 political intensely competing parties. Thus, contrary to the expected outcome of their moderation strategy, how is it possible to explain that paradox and these parties loss of Islamist voters?