The revolutionary upheavals and the winds of change that swept across the southern neighbourhood of Europe in 2011 prompted the EU to formulate a set of initiatives for a “partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” based on meritocracy, performance and differentiation principles, offering “more” market access and mobility, as well as political, institutional and financial assistance “for more” democratization and reforms. But, as the Moroccan case illustrates, the European good intentions and inflated promises not only veil a shortage of assistance firepower in the context of a lingering economic crisis, soaring sovereign debts, and sluggish growth in the old continent but also an absence of a clear vision and strategy towards the south, divergence among member states, and a tendency to preserve vested interests. Not only has the EU Mediterranean policy become increasingly securitized, but the meagre increases in assistance packages, the continuing protectionist attitudes of some member states such as Spain and France, and the fuzziness of future prospects reflect a continuing inadequacy between Europe’s grandiloquence and its feats, and a widening gap between its value-laden blueprints and its accomplishments. The EU still keeps a largely positive trade balance towards Morocco and its recent “trade concessions” still allow European exporter a wider access to the Moroccan market while competitive Moroccan agricultural and fisheries exports are still subjected to calendar and quota restriction.
On the other hand, the Moroccan case not only reflects the extent and efficacy of the EU’s predominantly rhetorical approach towards its southern neighbours but also provides an example of how the same discourse can be reproduced and instrumentalized to bolster the Kingdom’s own image internally and externally. In spite of the limited outcomes it reaps, the Moroccan state manages to capitalize on the “privileged partnership” and the “good pupil” reputation with the EU to project the image of a democratizing, modernizing and europeanizing country both for internal and external consumption. The skilful hype around the largely empty shell of Morocco’s “Advanced Status” agreement with the EU that was signed in 2008 with no concrete substance to date provides a revealing instance for this tendency.
International Relations/Affairs
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