The rapidly consolidating Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or the Taliban Movement of Pakistan has sought to forge a link between ‘authenticity’ and extremism in Pakistan. The July 2007 ‘Lal Masjid’ (Red Mosque) tragedy brought to light this emerging Taliban Movement of Pakistan. Details of the tragedy aside, what is noteworthy here is the links between this group led by Maulana Aziz and Maulana Ghazi with the outlawed Islamist extremist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-e-Jihad-Islami as well as with al-Qaeda and Afghan-Taliban elements in Pakistan’s remote Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Specifically, Maulana Aziz and Maulana Ghazi’s movement is thought to be linked with Baitullah Mehsud who is the leader of the Taliban militants in the Waziristan section of Pakistan’s FATA and also linked with Maulana Fazlullah who is the leader of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. TNSM was banned by Musharraf’s government in 2002 but has continued underground, developing a rigid Taliban rule in the Malakand region in NWFP. It is this TNSM that is now thought to have branched out into the newly consolidating Taliban Movement of Pakistan. The main targets of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan are the Pakistani government and the Pakistani security forces, and their main aim is the Talibanization of Pakistan. The most useful insights into the consolidating success of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan can only be gained, I argue, through its examination within the framework of the Social Movement Theory (SMT) explanation of contentious movements. Contending frameworks of explanations such as causal studies have left numerous questions unanswered such as the ‘when’ (timing) and the ‘how’ (the logistics) of radical activity, an understanding of which is critical in shedding light on the reasons for the success of radical groups and movements beyond the ‘why’ of such groups (the causes). The SMT framework addresses this void in understanding and thus consistent with the framework of SMT, I shall explain the success of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan in terms of its (a) effective exploitation of opportunity, (b) ideological resonance of its recruiting rhetoric, and (c) its effective resource mobilization. I shall use the findings of my study to forecast the actual nature of threat facing the Pakistani government, India, Afghanistan and the United States.