A comparative analysis of family law reform in two authoritarian constitutional monarchies (Morocco and Jordan) is proposed. The reform of family law in Morocco and Jordan presents an empirical puzzle. Support by the king was seen as crucial for the achievement of family law reform in Morocco in 2004 when Morocco issued a new family code. However, the Jordanian king supported family law reform as well and issued the amendments to the family code as royal decrees in 2001. Many members of the royal family were active in the campaign for legal change. Nonetheless, the amendments to the existing family law were blocked twice by the lower house of parliament in 2003 and 2004. Why should a reform supported by an authoritarian ruler fail? And why should an authoritarian ruler accept the open reversal of his decision? The paper will attempt to explain the different outcomes in the two monarchies and will address the question how policy-making works in an authoritarian monarchy taking family law reform as an example of policy-making. What role do international mechanisms such as CEDAW convention play in encouraging states to reform their laws and can these mechanisms account for the different outcomes? Do different actors (the state, women’s groups, religious authorities, Islamists) cooperate during the process, and how? And do the degree and kind of cooperation affect the outcome? Do actors and the state anticipate “learning effects” during the process and adjust their actions accordingly? In 2010 a new family draft law was issued in Jordan. The draft law has not been voted upon by parliament, but it is widely anticipated that the parliament will vote in favour of the law. One central argument that will be put forward thus sees the new inclusive nature of the family law reform process in 2010 in Jordan and the central role of the shari’a court administration (qadi al quda) as a central explanation for the new draft law being widely accepted. This alteration of practices can be seen as the result of a wider learning process of actors and the state alike. Nevertheless, the fact that the Moroccan king is far more dominant in the family law reform field than his Jordanian counterpart had as a result, that family law reform in Morocco reflects to a stronger extent the interests of the urban middle class which the Moroccan king intends to include in his power base.