While the ousting Mohamed Morsi and his Islamist backed government in July 2013 represented itself as an attempt to rescue the ‘civil state’ and co-opt religious-sectarian strife, the last two years witnessed a variety of violations of religious liberties as well as infringing a wide range of personal freedoms in the name of protecting the public religious sensibilities. To explain this anomaly, most observers underscore the effect of the ideological rivalry between the Islamist trends and the entrenched Egyptian bureaucracy. For these opinions, the ongoing official crackdown is meant to sideline the claims of the islamist opposition that ousting Morsi would result in a massive wave of ‘westernisation’ and ‘moral decay’. While these opinions provide an insight into the mind-set of the current ruling elite, it overlooks equally important dimension of the complex scene that is role of the constitutional and legal discourses by which these violations are made possible. Eventually, these violations utilise modern legal vocabulary that guarantees the freedom of religion and expression as well as the other principles of equality before law and non-discrimination. Ignoring such significant facts risks the relegation of the role of the legal elite and its debates to a mere secondary, instrumental position. In this regard, a number of questions still need to be addressed. Most notably, How the Egyptian courts and jurists are utilising them? How they are reconciling these limitations to the other aspects of the Constitution and legal framework that entrench individual rights and the principle of non-discrimination? In response to these questions, the paper argues that the current crackdown is driven by a logic that thwarting the Islamist challenge will not be possible without restricting other models of religiosity that have always been considered subversive to both the rational personhood and the public religious sensibility. It is indeed an attempt to reconstitute a form of hegemonic articulation of state-religion relation that is informed by a liberal imaginary of some sort, which has been facing immanent threat since 2011, rather than representing a deviation from the course of liberalisation. In this paper, I draw on a body of literature different traditions of radical democratic and post-structuralist critique of liberal democracy (Mouff 2000, Norval 2007, Skinner 1998, Tully 2008).