There has recently begun to develop a critical literature that re-assesses the late Ottoman history in an attempt to move beyond the domineering teleological approaches that have so long conditioned the late Ottoman history to the subsequent reality of nation-states. Teleological approaches essentially read the late Ottoman history, with knowledge of its outcome. Accordingly, the late Ottoman history has been tailored to explain its failures such as the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the First World War in a narrative continuity that foreshadows the eventual success story of the resistance movement and nation-building process orchestrated by Mustafa Kemal (later Ataturk in 1934). One significant component of this narrative is the Balkan Wars where the Balkan League comprised of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro defeated the Ottoman armies in late 1912, resulting in significant territorial losses on the part of the Ottomans despite a small-scale Ottoman reconquest that came by July 1913. This paper is an attempt to point out the teleological function that the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars has come to serve in the broader literature, whether nationalist or revisionist, and attempts to remedy it through a critical examination. In doing so, I hope propose an alternative framework to examine the impact of the Balkan Wars on the Ottoman elites and decision-makers in the absence of a teleological paradigm.