The Second World War precipitated an agricultural, economic and financial crisis unlike any Egypt had ever seen. The structures of free market capitalism, which except for brief periods since the 1880s had delivered riches to Egypt’s local and foreign elite, were now threatening it with famine and social unrest. With global trade cut by submarine warfare and German and Italian trade foresworn, Egypt’s cotton exports stagnated, and crucial fertilizer imports fell nearly to zero, causing yields on food crops to fall precipitously. The British responded with the Middle East Supply Center, which helped organize regional trade to address local shortfalls while using the smallest volume of shipping possible. However, in Egypt, its recommendations on domestic agricultural growing and commercial policies depended entirely on the political will of the government. Using government documents from the Egyptian National Archives, this paper examines the lesser known aspects of the Egyptian response to the crisis. It prompted the state to intervene more thoroughly than ever before in the growing and marketing of cotton and grain and in the consumption of food and other essentials. The principal mechanism for this control was the “state of siege,” a constitutional state of emergency which was initially intended to enforce censorship, prevent trading with the enemy and capture spies and fifth columnists, but gradually became the avenue for hundreds of executive proclamations relating to economic and social issues outside the traditional definition of public security. The Prime Ministers’ archived records of the military tribunals that enforced state of siege legislation reveal that more than two thirds of the estimated 150,000 civilians tried between 1940-1945 had been accused of infringing rationing rules, price control or were hoarding or transporting grain, sugar or cotton without licenses. At the same time, the state offered the carrot of high fixed prices to peasants for growing wheat and maize and easy credit to smallholders through the recently created Credit Agricole Bank, and subsidized consumption of the sha?abi loaf, kerosene and course cloth for the peasants by encouraging the spread of semi-autonomous rural cooperatives. These governmental efforts were not without their weaknesses and failures, and they drew criticism from the landed elite, but the new state structures and social commitments reshaped the role of the government in the lives of Egyptians foreshadowing Nasser-era policies in ways that are recognizable until the present day.