What has guided Jordan’s foreign policy since the uprisings in 2011? Plenty of observers have discussed how the Hashemite Kingdom survived the unrest despite civil war in Syria and Yemen; revolution in Egypt and Tunisia; and serious instability in Iraq, Bahrain, and Morocco. After securing its position in Amman, however, the regime remained aloof from counter-revolutionary politics spearheaded by Saudi and Egyptian officials and minimized its footprint in neighboring countries. How did the uprisings shape this external approach? I argue that Amman dodged revolution at home and avoided foreign adventurism due to a discourse of stability. In the uprising’s early days, the regime eroded support for its protest movement with reforms and by allowing protesters a peaceful outlet to vent frustration. As nation-states crumbled around the Kingdom, its experience spawned a discourse which lauded Jordan as a pillar of stability in a chaotic region. Jordanian consensus was to prevent Amman from becoming Damascus, thus drying-up demand for upheaval. As a result, Jordanian officials did not perceive unrest abroad as a threat to domestic serenity. They were therefore uninterested in supporting revolution-crushing ventures, such as the coup in Egypt (2013) or Saudi intervention in Bahrain (2011). Though Jordanian officials committed resources to the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen (2015-), they did so under public pressure from an Arab coalition with counter-Iranian (not counter-revolutionary) motivations and repeatedly stated their goal was “stability” in Sanaa. In short, Jordan’s domestic tranquility seeped into its regional dealings. Preliminary research for the study is based on fieldwork (August 2015-June 2016). Interviews with Jordanian officials and policy analysts will be conducted in Amman in June and July 2023.