Most analyses of Arab elections have focused on the role and performance of the Islamist opposition. In contrast, considerably less attention has been given to how formal and informal institutions have helped elect regime-backed elites and bind parliamentarians to a loyalist agenda during periods of political turbulence. By focusing on the aftermath of recent parliamentary elections in 2007, this study compares the rise of the “new capitalists” in Jordan with the emergence of the “Rally and Modernity” coalition in Morocco. How did the recent elections enable and strengthen these regime-backed forces? And what are the implications of their success for political stability in liberalizing Arab monarchies? This study tests the impact of electoral rules on the cohesion among ruling elites in hopes of developing a mid-range theory about the conditions under which elections reinforce authoritarian regimes. Although this paper is motivated by the surprising success of politicians in both countries who neither had tribal weight nor any kind of previous political base, the study is situated within the broader theoretical debate about why authoritarian regimes hold elections. The conventional wisdom about authoritarian elections has held they are mere “window dressing” to create a democratic façade and add legitimacy to the regime. This study is aligned with an emerging scholarship that views elections more instrumentally as an institutional mechanism for maintaining elite cohesion and structuring elite competition. With regards to the cases of Jordan and Morocco, I argue that recent parliamentary elections have increasingly served to deter potential elite defections and to co-opt potential dissidents with a role in national agenda setting. This paper is based on original research in both countries including key informant interviews conducted this summer with “new capitalist” parliamentarians in Jordan. It also utilizes statistical analysis to estimate the marginal effects of formal electoral rules, particular characteristics of electoral districts and other factors on the probability that Jordanian candidates and Moroccan parties won or lost in the 2007 parliamentary elections.