The end of Mubarak’s rule has spawned hope as much as it has created apprehension about Egypt’s future. With Mubarak gone, the question arises whether Egypt can develop democratic institutions despite its authoritarian legacy. One particular institutional practice that may raise concerns is the corporatist system of worker representation that was central to Egypt’s authoritarian formula. This corporatism was supported through a legal framework that granted a monopoly of representation to a single trade union federation, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), and gave the regime considerable leverage over trade union activities. Overall, this framework has arguably proved successful at preventing worker organizations from developing into an oppositional force. Yet, this corporatism has been challenged in recent years, notably by the emergence of a grass-root movement calling for trade unions’ independence from the regime. This movement is lead by a group of real estate tax officials who, in December 2008, created their own “independent union:” the Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers (IGURETAW). Though the Mubarak government tolerated the new union to an extent, the IGURETAW’s official status remained ambiguous because of enduring legal obstacles to its recognition. In fact, despite their relative success, the tax collectors did not succeed in altering the main institutional and legal tools whereby the regime limited associational freedom. The establishment of a military caretaker government, however, may open new opportunities for institutional change. It is probable that the union will take advantage of this new political environment to push for reform. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it attempts to elucidate the conditions for effective popular mobilization in authoritarian settings by explaining how the IGURETAW could come into being despite the institutional and legal obstacles that the organization faced. Second, the paper assesses the extent to which popular mobilization may bring about institutional change in authoritarian settings (both during periods of authoritarian stability and transition), by assessing the impact of the movement for the independence of trade unions on Egypt’s institutional structure. The research of this paper is based on interviews in Arabic conducted in 2010 with key figures of the Egyptian trade union movement, direct observation of trade union activities and protests, and an exhaustive review of the Egyptian press for the 2007-2009 period.