This paper examines how protesters engaging in episodes of contentious politics around natural resources mobilize, innovate, and demobilize. It looks in detail at one wave of protest in the southern Tunisian governorate of Tataouine, which took place in the first half of 2017 against a backdrop of disenchantment with institutional politics and rising nationwide protest. Contentious politics like this is not self-evident. But paying close attention to how protests develop and evolve offers valuable alternative readings of a transition away from authoritarianism and reaches beyond a common focus on political elites. The paper draws on a close study of the 'Kamour' sit-in in southern Tunisia, which were the largest protests since the uprisings of 2010-11 and among the most successful in their claim-making. It shows how protests develop beyond goals of material self-interest to pursue new moral visions about the relationship between the citizenry and national resources even in a comparatively oil-poor state. It charts the incremental and improvisational transformation of a protest movement from short stoppages and sit-ins to widespread road blocks targeting particular vehicles to strategic direct action against the weak points in petroleum distribution networks. This is a repertoire of organization and action influenced by protest experiences beyond local and national boundaries. In its methodological approach this work draws on a protest event analysis of the Kamour demonstrations over a period of six months, generated from media reports, including an online archive of a local radio station, Radio Tataouine. It is also based on fieldwork in Tunisia, including qualitative interviews with several dozen protesters, from the Kamour protest wave and from other demonstrations across Tunisia. This paper demonstrates how interplay and negotiations with state actors can mobilize rather than contain protests. It shows how protesters consciously avoided the involvement of traditional political actors, like parties and trade unions. It argues that protests which put most economic pressure on the state are most likely to succeed in making claims. And it exposes the superficiality of state-constructed notions of reformism and consensus, which in Tunisia have historically operated as techniques of regime control.