In classic Islamic political theory, the concepts of consultation (shura) and reason (‘aql) are inherently connected, as only the learned men (‘oqala) are entitled to counsel the sovereign. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Iranian discourse on shura was inseparable from that on ‘aql, consultation being presented as a primary means to improve the ruler’s capacity to use his reason and thus govern in justice. During the years of the Constitutional Movement (1905-1911), both shura and ‘aql acquired a new meaning, introducing to the Iranian audience the new concepts of political representation and intelligentsia (‘oqala) correspondingly. However, such a change cannot be reduced to a mere transfer of concepts from the West to the East; instead, it should be contextualized within the framework of the gradual evolution of shura and ‘aql as entangled concepts. While the possession of ‘aql was considered by Iranian scholars as a prerequisite of economic, military and social development, shura represented a major tool to conduct politics with reason and thus enabled the introduction of the idea of collective reason. This paper demonstrates that throughout the nineteenth century the concepts of shura and ‘aql were systematically used to curb the sovereign’s power, enlarge the horizon of expectation and increase the agency of Iranians. A careful reading of Qajar political treatises (andarznameha-ye siyasi) shows that Sufi literature and doctrine on the ‘perfect man’ played a considerable role in the evolution of the Iranian political discourse based on the principle of ‘aql. Though Sufi influence was far from straightforward, it can be perceived in the authors’ use of Qur’anic and poetical references such as Jalal al-Din Rumi (d. 1273). The quality of perfection being traditionally reserved to the Prophet in classic Shii‘ theology, the Qajar authors not only attributed it to the Shah but also outlined for him a path of endless self-improvement towards the perfect reason (‘aql-e koll) through consultation (mashvarat). Moreover, consultation was recommended to Islamic scholars thus breaking the ‘oqala’s monopoly on sound judgement. The paper posits that the idea to extend the circle of ‘oqala, which finally enabled the practice of national consultation, was already present in the nineteenth-century Qajar discourse on consultation. It concludes that the dialectical relationship between perfect reason and universal consultation in the Qajar political thought paved the way towards the conceptual change which marked the constitutional debates.