The ongoing crisis in Gaza has significantly affected the security and regional position of all Gulf states with various domestic and foreign policy considerations. The six countries’ behaviour is characterised by both managing possible and actual security threats connected to the ongoing crisis and utilizing the ongoing developments for their own interests. Consequently, in spite of the tendency among observers to put them in the same category or differentiate between them based on the nature of their relationship with Israel (i.e., participants of the Abraham Accords vs. the rest), their strategy is markedly different. In addition, given their development and humanitarian policies and political calculations regarding their relations with Israel and Palestine, they are expected to play an outsized role even after the war ends in Gaza. The paper aims to compare the role of the six Gulf countries in the different stages of the ongoing crisis in Gaza and the calculations behind their strategy. The research will utilize two theoretical perspectives – the omnibalancing framework, suggesting that the six governments formed their strategy on the basis of balancing between both domestic and international threats, and the notion of virtual enlargement, a strategy associated with small states that try to enlarge their importance in the international system using various soft power means. These two concepts help us interpret the differences and similarities between their strategy and their position. Besides the primary aim of the research to identify the nuances of Gulf states’ strategy towards Gaza and the crisis, the paper seeks to decide if we can expect an intensification of competition between the six countries in shaping the future of Palestinian politics.