Within relevance-theoretic approaches, pragmatists have recently discovered a phenomenon known as unarticulated constituents (Recanati, 2002, Carston, 2002), the absence of certain linguistic elements that have truth-conditional effects on the proposition at the level of what is said. Any interpretation of the proposition necessitates pragmatic processes known as completion and expansion (Bach, 1994) or saturation and enrichment (Recanati, 2002) to recover the communicated meaning contextually. The following examples illustrate these processes better: I’ve had a very large breakfast (today) You’re not going to die (from that cut) ((Recanati, 2002, pp. 300-301). The unarticulated constituent in example (1) is ‘today’, while in the second is ‘from that cut’. Unarticulated constituents are part of a broader debate between semantics and pragmatics known as semantic underdeterminacy. Medieval Islamic legal texts are replete with copious discussions that correspond to the notion of unarticulated constituents which have produced different understandings. In consequence, those deferring understandings have led to different and even contrasting Sharia laws. This paper aims at comparing medieval Islamic jurists’ studies of unarticulated constituents to that of modern pragmatics. Based on Islamic jurists’ analyses, the paper will make two arguments. On the one hand, these pragmatic processes are seemingly called for only when they have truth-conditional effects on the proposition. This means that the recovery of unarticulated constituents may modify the intended meaning by means of disambiguation. However, disambiguation is not always the case. The paper will show evidence from what is known as ‘ʾalʾiṭla:q wa ltaqīīd’ in Islamic jurisprudence that eliminating an object (or transforming a transitive verb to an intransitive one) as an instance of unarticulated constituents would lead to a different interpretation and consequently cause a different legal outcome. On the other hand, the mechanism by which the recovery is achieved has always been questionable and argumentative. Theoretically, these discussions may constitute valid grounds for reexamining and seriously questioning a number of relevant aspects of the notion of unarticulated constituents in modern pragmatics as follows: When and on what basis should these unarticulated constituents be recovered from the context? How can a decision be taken to recover an appropriate constituent among a wide range of possible candidates? What is the source of the recovery? Typical (lay) readers or professionals (jurists/ linguists/philosophers)? The results suggest that those pragmatic processes need to be either reconceptualized or studied more carefully.