This paper discusses the importance of Twitter, Telegram, and Instagram to the global formation and circulation of Iranian protest literature in the early twenty-first century. In the 2009 protests against Ahmadinejad’s re-election, the migration of Iranian poets to Twitter, and the new genre of the tweet, led to an elaborate network of social connections in the online space, where relationality could flourish without explicit personal identity. The tweet’s ephemerality created a literary form that proved uniquely flexible in a climate of political persecution and censorship, because it was both personal and expressive, and potentially anonymous. Hashtags, memes, and gifs added further intermedial richness and virtual embodiment to Twitter as a platform for collective expression and organization, blurring the boundaries between activism in digital and physical space. I draw on Negar Mottahedeh’s central study #iranelection for this part of the paper. In the age of Trump, however, it is difficult to argue for Twitter as a liberating medium or utopian space of free expression. The platform is now deeply associated with trolls, doxers, hate groups, and the US President’s own brand of inflammatory, accusatory monologues, which frequently center around Islamophobic sentiment and stereotype. Trump is not the only world leader to use social media as an unconventional political mouthpiece: Sheikh Mohammed of UAE, for example, posted an Instagram poem (which went viral) in the summer of 2017 as a means of urging Qatar to adhere to Saudi demands. In light of this shift to a more authoritarian Twitter, the second half of my paper examines the diversification of more recent Iranian dissident speech across platforms, notably Telegram and Instagram. I will address various mediums’ abilities to use proxy servers and circumvent censorship, and close-read the aesthetic effects of image-centric versus text-centric platforms, as well as various configurations of authorship and “following,” on the efficacy of these social media as protest tools. I will simultaneously discuss the diversification of causes of protest in Iran, which are now harder to categorize than the youth-oriented, female-dominated, mostly upper-middle class, urban protests of 2009. Even as Twitter quickly gives way to other platforms, I ultimately argue that online intertextuality will continue to play a crucial role for Iranian protest literature as a particular node in global dissident and poetic networks.