The literature on comparative authoritarianism (particularly Slater, Slovik, and Greitens) suggests three possible scenarios for Egypt’s future political development: - Continued economic stagnation and elite fragmentation that lead to ever-increasing dependence on the security apparatus to maintain order and to manage the affairs of state. This trajectory resembles Argentina or Brazil in the 1970s. - Implementation of partial economic reforms that generate some economic growth and create a segment of the elite that benefits disproportionately from this gain. This trajectory produces crony capitalism that resembles contemporary Russia. - Implementation of more comprehensive economic reform that strengthens private actors’ autonomy from the state including owners of capital as well as representatives of labor. These actors then become supporters of civil society and political parties that gradually facilitate the emergence of more participatory politics and, possibly, democracy. Chile and South Korea are examples of this trajectory. The paper proposes a theoretical framework for evaluating which scenario is most likely based upon the literature on comparative institutional development (Mahoney, Thelen, and Hall). This framework focuses on three institutions: security institutions, economic institutions, and institutions for political mobilization. It considers both domestic and international pressures on the development of each. The analysis considers the current condition of each of these institutions, their relative power to each other, and the likely future trajectory of their development in light of the policies adopted by the al-Sisi regime. It utilizes a wide variety of sources including interviews with party activists from all of the major political groupings, Islamic activists, NGO leaders, retired military officers, labor officials, police officers at all ranks, and former senior officials from the ruling party; archival material related to the emergence of key public sector enterprises, private firms, and major financial institutions; budget data; economic data; voting data from the 2015 parliamentary election; relevant actions by key international actors; and constraints created by the international economic and political system that shape the development of each institution. The analysis concludes that the second trajectory described above -- development of crony capitalism centered on the enrichment of a small elite -- is the most likely trajectory for the current regime. It then considers what conditions would need to change in order to facilitate the development of the third trajectory. It pays particular attention to the possible contribution of external actors to facilitating the development of a more participatory and equitable order.