While many cited the robustness of Tunisia's civil society as a key factor in building a new democratic polity, widespread initial support for president Kais Saied's July 25 2021 coup and the weak mobilizations on the street in the weeks following led many academics and analysts to question the role of civil society in forming a bulwark against democratic backsliding and authoritarian return. Leading up to July 25, the repression of social movements like Manich Msemah ("I will not forgive") and Fech Nestanaou ("What are we waiting for"), increasing populist rhetoric including references to "foreign interference" through civic organizations, and a leaked draft law that would return Tunisia's civil society governance approach to a "security first" orientation all constituted significant attacks on associational life. The presumption by students of Tunisia's democratization was that civil society in Tunisia was strong, while in practice significant divisions played out following the 2010-2011 uprisings that militated against a concerted response to Saied's coup. Through a cross-national survey of youth participants in civil society (2016), two actor mapping exercises (2016, 2022), and in-depth interviews with non-profit executives, donors, head-hunters, and political and economic elites (2012-2021), my research examines the impact of international aid on the Tunisian transition. I argue that the NGOization of Tunsia's civil society exacerbated social divisions, leading to widespread distrust between “new” and “old” organizations, a fissure between “secular” and Islamist orientations, and deep regional divides between "interior" regions and the coastal Tunis-Sfax axis. I argue that NGOization in Tunisia had five major effects: First, NGOization diverted responsibility from the state to provide for social welfare as NGOs filled this critical gap in service provision, technical training, and access to basic goods. Second, NGOization caused a diversion of resources away from social movements and into formalized non-profit organizations, leading to a reform-oriented (rather than revolution-oriented) set of claims. Third, NGOization entailed a concentration of funding on issues like migration and deradicalization that the EU and US prioritized, rather than addressing needs-based issues such as socio-economic development and employment. Fourth, the “projectization” of civic space concentrated donor funding in a few major secular and youth-led organizations that were first out the gate, ultimately reproducing regionalism and exacerbated conditions of “multiple marginalization." And fourth, through a lack of donor or governmental oversight and a loose regulatory framework, NGOization led to corruption, misappropriation of funds, and other forms of exploitation and abuse in the industry.