In 2005 the Syrian government announced that the country was transitioning from a socialist economic system to a “social market economy.” The move was part of a broader economic reform process initiated under Bashar al-Asad’s leadership. While scholars have examined the regime’s motivations for launching reform and the ways in which it was implemented, one crucial aspect of this process has not been critically examined: the unprecedented incorporation of international networks of experts, consultants, and technocrats into Syria’s authoritarian modality of governance. In this paper I map the transnational expertise networks that were integral in developing and implementing Syria’s reform agenda, and examine the ways in which these networks helped to shape a new political configuration in Syria. I contend that economic reform, far from a depoliticized technical sphere, helped to constitute a new mode of authoritarian rule that served the interests of both domestic ruling elites and (global) economic elites. Unlike prevalent narratives that focus on the core regime elite (or one-man rule) in authoritarian politics, I treat technocratic policy-making as a site of power and governance, and experts as significant political actors. Specifically, by tracing the flows of foreign technical assistance, the paper brings to light a connection between Syria and Germany, whose support of the Asad regime has never been critically examined or scrutinized. Before Syria’s adoption of the “social market economy” paradigm in 2005 this economic model had only ever formally existed in Germany. The exportation of this paradigm to Syria was only the most visible manifestation of a more profound technocratic alliance between the two countries. As a testament to the endurance of these expertise networks, almost four years into the political and humanitarian crisis in Syria, the same networks remain critical to distributing aid, channeling humanitarian relief, and planning for post-war reconstruction. Rather than becoming immaterial, these networks of expertise have been reconstituted and repurposed in the context of Syria’s civil war. As evidence for this argument, I draw on interviews with consultants and technocrats involved in the Syrian economic reforms. I also analyze a diverse array of technical documents and assessments, government reports, public speeches and statements, and statistical data on aid grants and loans. The research contributes not only to a more fine-grained understanding of authoritarian control in Asad’s Syria, but also to how networks of expertise may come to shape the political possibilities for post-war Syria.