Three events of the past 18th months, namely, The Woman, Life, Freedom Movement of September 2022, the China-brokered Suadi-Iran deal of March 2023, and the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel loom large in Iran’s recent history. These events presented challenges and opportunities for the Islamic Republic of Iran. This paper explores how these three events have affected Iran’s domestic and foreign policy objectives during the past 18 months. Specifically, I will argue that “purification” has become the centerpiece of Iran’s domestic policy. The purification project that had started even before the Presidential Election of 2021 is being pursued with more rigor and purpose after the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising. To address the gap between the new generation of Iranians and the old revolutionaries, the Nezam, I will argue, had two fundamental choices to make: to liberalize or to tighten the grip. The Nezam chose the latter and is willing to pay the sociopolitical costs associated with this policy. The ascendancy of the narrative of the super-revolutionaries was followed by electoral policies and procedures of the Guardian Council to ensure a more homogenized and purified Nezam(regime) especially when the election of the Assembly of Experts and that of the successor were on the horizon. Regionally, contrary to what one may expect after the super-headliners' ascendancy, I will argue that the Islamic Republic’s eastward-looking and the use of proxies approach to global and regional politics are being recalibrated after what has unfolded since October 7. The Islamic Republic’s call for the destruction of the Zionist state as well as its longstanding opposition to the two-state solution seems to have been merely rhetorical. However, the crux of my presentation will be about the inconsistency that exists between Iran’s domestic purification agenda after Woman, Life, Freedom, and its softer, gentler, and even more pragmatic approach to its regional politics. I will argue that the domestic purification project has not led to a more aggressive or belligerent approach in the region after October 7. Iran’s military responses, I will argue, have been measured and quite contained. This may indicate that Iran’s foreign policy is less ideological and more pragmatic than is generally believed.