In the context of the Syrian Revolution, we will look at the transformation of the social capital. We define “revolution” as a brutal and unanticipated transformation of the various capitals (social, economic, cultural) and of the relations between various fields such as the political, religious, judiciary and economic ones. Moreover, we use Bourdieu (1980)’s definition of social capital as opposed to Putnam (2003)’s or Coleman (1988)’s. This paper is based on a qualitative methodology and derives from two fieldworks undertaken in December 2012-January 2013 and August-September 2013 in the rebel-held areas of Northern Syria and in Turkey. In total, more than 150 semi-structured interviews were realized with Syrians from all over the country. First, we show that the activists in the first (peaceful) phase of the mobilization do not mobilize their social capital. Faced with a repressive regime, protesters had to hide their identity when they mobilize, making weak links ineffective, and even cutting ties with their friends and relatives to get involved in the movement. In addition, prerevolutionary social positions in Syria do not predict participation in the 2011 mobilization. Second, during the peaceful protests, new social networks were forged, creating effectively a "revolutionary social capital". When rebels took control of the first areas, from 2012 onwards, this revolutionary capital played then a central role in the formation of the insurgent civil institutions. Syria in that sense shows that institutions can be the result, in revolutionary contexts, of a formalization of social networks. At the same time, for those who did not participate in the protest, the civil war led to a tremendous loss of social capital. In consequence, Syrians in rebel-held areas have two social capitals, one pre-revolutionary and one revolutionary, which, according to the setting, can strengthen, weaken or have no effect on one another. Third, we show that pre-revolutionary social positions play a role later in accessing the institutions created by revolutionaries. Indeed, previous social hierarchies influence the conversion of revolutionary social capital into institutional positions (and economic resources). While the most modest groups have largely engaged in the insurgency, the middle class quickly monopolized the civil institutions in Syria and the representative institutions, outside Syria, were mostly staffed with people from the internationalized elite. In other words, the mobilization and the civil war changed radically the social structure in Syria, creating a rift in the new revolutionary elites.