Kalam arguments about the nature of God remain relevant to modern philosophy of religion. In particular, the question of how to reconcile tawhid, the doctrine of the total unity of God, with Qur’anic references to God’s attributes and the features of a personal God forced Muslim theologians and philosophers to deal with difficult questions about how these aspects of a theistic God might be reconciled. The doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) has been defended by many theist philosophers such as Augustine, al-Farabi, Avicenna, Anselm, and Aquinas. DDS holds that God is free of essence-existence composition. He neither has parts nor internal structure. His attributes such as omnipotence, omnibenevolence, or omniscience cannot be distinct. Though this leads to some difficulties, I will discuss a particular problem, the problem of the incompatibility between divine simplicity and freedom. DDS leads to two difficulties with respect to freedom. First, if God is simple and thus has no internal structure, he seems to have a necessary intention in his any creative action, as was held by, for example, Avicenna. This is incompatible with the notion of libertarian freedom because according to this theory, God is supposed to choose what to actualize among different alternatives. If he is not able to do otherwise (actualizing a different possible world or not actualizing any world at all), he cannot be considered free. Second, if God necessarily creates this universe and his will is absolute about everything including human actions, there is no human freedom. I argue that a theist will have to pay a heavy price if she wants to argue for the compatibility of divine simplicity and freedom. I claim that the first problem can be solved if we show that divine freedom does not need to be a libertarian freedom. This, I think, is implausible for many theists because the view that God could have created another world instead of this world is at the core of classical theism. I also argue that we can save humanly freedom only if we deny that God has a will about any particular human action. This would be also implausible for many theists because it denies God’s direct continuous creation, sustaining, or answering prayers.