In a critical contribution to contemporary discussions of rights-based discourses, Charles Blattberg argues that a major shortcoming in “human rights talk” is that it is too “thin” (2009). In particular, he argues that a consistent lapse in extant conversations is the move to abstraction: the human is insufficient precisely because it is impersonal. Blattberg lodges this criticism against a host of liberal thinkers, including Nussbaum, Berlin, and Walzer, and contends that the move to abstraction hinders calls to justice insofar as this abstraction fails to invest actors in the plights of other people. Even as Blattberg insists on the personalizing of the people to be protected, there remains the difficulty of discerning how, precisely to flesh out the people onto whom rights should be mapped. Moreover, in suggesting that the abstract human need only be personalized, Blattberg subtly elides more radical rethinkings: why not replace the human in human rights altogether? In this essay I draw on the language of Moroccan Islamists to argue that the abstract human that Blattberg calls into question is but one possible foundation for a rights-based discourse. My research suggests that Moroccan Islamists articulate and embody a rights-based discourse that does away with both the abstract human and the imminently empathetic person and instead centers God and God’s injunctions. In other words, whereas “rights” seemingly emerge from the variously constructed “human” postulated (fantasized, even) in secular arguments, for Islamists “rights” are guaranteed and circumscribed by God’s Will, as delineated in the Qur’an and hadith—and, of course, variously interpreted. In this essay I analyze ordinary language interviews with over 100 Islamists from Morocco’s two most popular groups, the Party of Justice and Development and the Group of Justice and Spirituality. I argue that my interlocutors not only displace the human from “human rights,” but, correspondingly, also revise significantly the meaning and practice of a variety of specifically instantiated human rights—reconsidering, e.g., what practices of religious freedom ought to look like. Finally, I submit that an Islamist vision of rights should be read as a pointed criticism of both the practical and abstract components of liberal articulations of rights and an expansion of the Muslim tradition.