Several young men in Iraqi Kurdistan regularly wear a wooden cross on a faux leather strand around their necks. In the global north, such an act signifies a Christian, even Protestant, identity. But what does it mean in Iraqi Kurdistan? Are these converts to Christianity? No, not exactly. In this paper, I argue that what could be labeled as “conversion” in Iraqi Kurdistan should instead be viewed as a tactic that is part of upward social mobility. For these young men the adoption of “western cultural Christianity” constitutes a change in socio-economic class and communal affiliation, rather than a newfound conviction that “Christ saves.” There is a crucial distinction between the young men’s “western cultural Christianity,” and local, “traditional” Chaldean, Orthodox, and Catholic churches and communities, which remain marginalized. Notably, there has been a similar concurrent phenomenon, wherein at least nominally Muslim Kurds turned towards Zoroastrian practices and discourses following the rise of Da’esh in 2014. Disgusted with the ongoing violence, some Kurds turned away from Islam and even argued that the reason that Kurds are “backward” is Islam. Zoroastrianism in this context, similarly to western cultural Christianity, symbolized modernity, education, as well as upward class mobility. To theorize these phenomena, this paper draws on Bourdieu’s work on the relationship between taste and class. It argues that in this context, we must rethink the concept of religious conversion and more closely pay attention to class and class distinctions.