Why do local governments vary in their provision of public goods (i.e., street cleanliness, adequate sewerage systems, maintenance of roads, etc.) in authoritarian countries? Why do some local governments manage to provide beautiful parks, paved roads, and clean marketplaces while others offer only the bare minimum of public services? To answer these questions, the paper will explore the impact of formal institutions (i.e., elections) and informal methods of accountability on service provision in Jordan. For instance, does the popular election of council members affect the quality of municipal services or do appointed officials do just as well? Similarly, do informal mechanisms and relationships, such as civic associations, tribal networks, and homogeneity of the resident population influence the quality or agenda of the leaders that are selected? In a society where tribal ties are still strong, what motivates local councilors and mayors to serve other tribes in addition to their own? Evidence will be drawn from quantitative analysis of governance indicators gathered from all 93 of Jordan’s municipalities as well as by interviews conducted in Amman and in municipalities that serve as case studies of good and bad governance.