Despite having been allowed to participate in institutional politics as a ‘loyal opposition’ party since 1996 (Zeghal, 2005), the Moroccan Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has had to self-limit its political activities in order to be tolerated by the Moroccan regime (Willis, 2004). As a consequence of the regional Arab uprisings of 2011, however, the PJD was allowed to join the official political game at the highest level as it was the only political party that enjoyed a considerable degree of legitimacy in the eyes of Moroccan voters. The PJD’s internal democratic dynamic and the popular support it enjoys are what differentiates the PJD from the rest of the Moroccan political landscape. The role its 'civil society wing' plays in service delivery at the municipal level has been crucial to this popularity. Indeed, particularly since 2009, when the government devolved significant decision-making authority vis-a-vis service delivery to municipal governments, the issue of service delivery has become highly contested with the PJD winning municipal elections based on its promises of and performance in delivering services, including social welfare services. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2010, 2011 and 2012 in the town of Kenitra, where the PJD won the last municipal elections and dominates the municipal council, this paper examines the party's promotion and engagement of civil society in order to improve service delivery and the significance of this engagement for the PJD, civil society and municipal service delivery. It argues that the PJD's strategy of engaging civil society in order to advance its agenda is generating contradictory political dynamics. On the one hand, civil society organizations associated with the PJD successfully have worked together with secular associations not affiliated with the PJD in order to help improve service delivery. On the other hand, civil society organizations not affiliated with the PJD argue that they have been excluded from municipal decision-making and municipal funding, generating a confrontational relationship with the party. This contradictory relationship casts doubt on the degree to which the party is engaging in a more equitable distribution of services as compared to previous parties in power and, consequently, on the sustainability of the party's popularity.