How have the economic and security challenges that have accompanied Tunisia’s transition affected the social cleavages underlying its party system? A number of scholars (Zeghal 2013; Lust and Waldner 2016) have observed that conflicts between Islamist and secularist elites structured Tunisia’s party system in the initial years following its uprising. But we know little about the degree to which this conflict is salient beyond the political elite (Gorman 2018) or about the degree to which perceptions of economic and security deterioration have undermined or strengthened the appeal of political secularism and political Islam. These questions evoke broader ones regarding the balance of “values” and “interests” in the party systems of other new democracies (Tavits and Letki 2013). In this paper, I argue that widespread perceptions of deterioration have neither reinforced the conflict between secularism and political Islam nor replaced it with the type of economic left-right conflict that is commonly the focus of comparative politics. Rather, these perceptions have fostered support for anti-system politicians of various stripes. I support this argument through evidence drawn from a nationally representative, in-person survey conducted in the wake of the 2019 presidential and legislative elections.