This presentation focuses on the local power dynamics in the Red Sea Region. More specifically it aims to analyze the economic and political policies related to regional port and logistics networks implemented by the Gulf states, primarily United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Horn of Africa. UAE has become an active player in the Horn of Africa. First through investments into African agriculture to secure a steady and affordable supply of foodstuff for their populations. Second, through massive investments in banking, extractive industries, real estate, retail, education and above all, transport in Africa, investments only surpassed by China. And thirdly through maritime trade, and more recently of port management and logistics. With a growing African middle class with higher spending possibilities, maritime traffic through Africa’s ports is expected to increase manifold over the next couple of decades. As such, there are solid economic reasons for UAE through its parastatal port operator DP World to invest in ports in the Horn of Africa not least because Africa is significantly undersupplied with port capacity today. So far, UAE operates the Berbera container port in Somaliland, and has won the contract to upgrade the air and naval base facilities around Berbera airport. UAE furthermore manages the Bosaso port in Puntland, Mogadishu and Barawe ports in Somaila and has established military bases on Socotra and Perim Island in Yemen, and until recently managed the Doraleh Container Terminal in Djibouti. The central thesis of this presentation is that UAE is projecting its power into the Horn of Africa. While most of its engagement is founded on purely economic ground, a part of it based on geopolitics, i.e. on considerations to increase its political influence in the Horn of Africa. One obvious way this manifest itself is the construction of facilities to host military vessels in the commercial ports operated by DP World. Among reasons for this emphasis are efforts to counteract the increasing role that Iran is playing in Horn of Africa. This presentation aims to analyze this development in the light of UAE’s shifting role, from a ‘softer’ to a ‘harder’ foreign policy player in the political landscape in the region. The paper is based on extensive field work carried out in the UAE, Djibouti and Somaliland during the early part of 2022.