The Friday sermon is an important discursive practice, a useful public forum and medium for channeling religious, public, and socio-political announcements. In other words, the Friday sermon is a rhetorical discourse par excellence, for its main objective is persuasion that leads to action. The imam’s persuasive methods take on the shape of an emotional rhetoric that moves and thrills by targeting the hearts and raw emotions of the congregation. But do all imams use the pulpit to the same end: to provide the congregation with social and personal guidance based on the teachings of the Prophet and his disciples? Or do some imams go beyond the social and religious tenets of the sermon and engage in current political debate and go as far as inciting the congregation to act on their counsel? Both brands exist: the first brand of sermons is often seen as representing official government discourse, while the second brand is viewed as representing extremist and militant Islam. Therefore, given the recent rise in militant Islam, and especially in the post 9/11 era, many Arab and Muslim states needed to act in order to contain the radical movements that emanate from certain “progressive” mosques. Morocco is one of these states currently struggling to reign in the fundamentalist Friday sermon and its compelling rhetorical message. The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the roles of the imams in Moroccan mosques, especially in the last decade, and the extent to which some imams have used rhetoric to contribute to the rise of radical Islam in Morocco. It is also an attempt at studying the Moroccan government’s response to this challenge and the types of measures the state has taken to maintain its image of a moderate and stable Muslim state. Ultimately, regardless of who wins this contest, the religious landscape in Morocco will never be the same.