Since the Communist coup d’état of 1978, Afghanistan has experienced dramatic events, which have brought deep social changes. The massive departure of the urban middle class, especially after 1992, and the rise of a military class of commanders as well as of human rights activists have modified the structure of society. Afghanistan can be seen as a political arena where different actors struggle to prevail. With different strategies and means, they all seek to increase their influence and constituency in tapping the resources available, in large part from originating from outside. In an exploratory way, I distinguish four types of transnational networks that bring material and immaterial resources in Afghanistan, resources that will be used in the power games. First, trading networks, which include illegal activities, smuggling of manufactured goods, but also – of course – drug trafficking. Secondly Islamist networks, bringing weapons and money, fighters and logistic support from a global nebulous world of supporters. The migration networks, then, by which the money of millions of Afghans living in Pakistan, Iran, but also in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula or in the West, is sent to Kabul, Ghazni and Herat. The humanitarian networks, finally, which carry out projects and provide training and employment to an emerging class of activists who occupies a growing place in the public arena in Afghanistan. Ministers or MPs, traffickers or commanders, defenders of human rights or Islamic militants, farmers or shopkeepers, fathers or mothers of large families, all Afghan men and women – or almost – are connected in one way or another with the outside world. These actors do not deploy, of course, strategies equally acceptable. But they all share the characteristic of promoting their visions and interests relying on transnational links.